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Ethics And The New tyle Candidate Pollster 
BRUCE E. ALTSCHULER 
SUNYOswego 
Everywhere the American public turns, it seems to find itself explained 
by one sort of poll or another. For many years George Gallup and Louis 
Harris have been selling their surveys to newspapers. Now every newspaPer 
and television station seems to have its own survey on every subjec t. Then 
there are the Nielsen ratings to tell us what we watch on televisio n, market 
research to tell business what we will buy, the wire service polls to tell us 
who the best college football team is, a poll of historians to tell us which 
Presidents succeeded and which failed, while everyone seems to be taking a 
poll to let us know who we want as our next President, even if we have just 
finished electing the last one. So flooded are we with polls that it is ea y 10 
forget that polling is a very recent phenomenon. Truly systematic political 
polls are only about fifty years old. Polls taken for political ca nd idates did 
not come into significant use until the l 940's and have only beco me an im. 
portant part of most campaigns in the last twenty years.' Typica lly a can-
didate would hire a polling firm to take and analyze surveys. Mos t polling 
reports consisted of the presentation of simple trial heat resu lts together 
with cross-tabulations concerning key groups and major issues, with occa-
sional panel studies. When the campaign ended, the pollster wou ld return to 
his other clients while the candidate, win or lose, would not be likely to con-
sult professionally with the pollster until the next campaign. 
Since then, the role of those who take polls for candidates ha changed 
dramatically. Because of the difficulty of obtaining full and hone t infor-
mation about the internal workings of political campaigns, the significance 
of these changes has been largely ignored. 2 This article exa mine s the e 
changes and their implications, including a number of possib le danger 
caused by the changed role of private campaign pollsters. 
The most important change has been the growth in the importance of 
both the polls and the poll takers. In 1968, $6 million was spe nt by can-
didates for 1200 polls . In 1980, the two major party president ia l candidate 
each spent more than a million dollars, with a total spent by all candidate 
for office of approximately $20 million for 2000 polls. 3 
There are several reasons for this increase. Some is due to the inflation 
that has increased all campaign costs. The rest is caused by changes in cam-
paigns and polls. The modern campaign has created a need for the type of 
information provided by polls. On the presidential level, there ha been a 
sharp increase in the number of important primaries, requiring candidate 
to have knowledge of an intricate set of rules. As a result, eac h candidate 
has more choices to make, increasing the need for reliable and detailed in-
formation. On all levels, increased reliance on television has caused can-
didates to utilize polls to develop and refine their strategy. Most candidate , 
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her than depending on the party, put together their own campaign staff, 
rat h ' d . I O f h . f' . 
f n relying on a ire campaign consu tant. ne o t eir irst acts 1s to 0 te . ke a poll to help determine strategy. In 1980, when John Connally sought 
ta recruit Lee Atwater to manage his South Carolina primary effort, the lat-
to after studying thirteen state polls, decided that Connally's large 
ier;atives (only 26% viewed him positively compared to 37% who had 
n:gative views) meant certain defeat so he declined the offer.• Lowell 
~eicker announced his presidential candidacy in March 1979 but withdrew 
only two months later, citing a poll which showed him trailing Gerald Ford 
and Ronald Reagan, but ahead of four other contenders, in his home state 
of Connecticut. 5 Since Ford was never to become a candidate, this appears, 
in retrospect, not to have been as serious as Weicker claimed but the weak 
poll results had negative effects on fund raising and press coverage. For the 
more successful efforts of Reagan and Carter, as will be discussed later, 
tracegy memos were drawn up by the pollsters themselves. 
Also adding to the cost of polls has been their increasingly sophisti-
cated methodology. Instead of the simple trial heats and cross-tabs, 
there is now considerable use of more complex statistical methods such as 
multidimensional scaling. 6 Also common is the daily tracking survey, used 
by both Carter and Reagan to measure progress. Even the questioning has 
become more sophisticated. Instead of simply asking people how they in-
tended to vote, Patrick Caddell, Jimmy Carter's pollster, followed up by 
asking a series of specific questions so as to make the respondent think more 
eriously about his vote (as he would on primary or election day). When a 
second candidate choice question was then posed, the result was often a 
changed response. These second response figures revealed potential dangers 
and opportunities hidden by simple trial heat polls. During the New Hamp-
hire primary, while published polls showed a large Carter lead, the ad-
justed totals indicated that Senator Kennedy was closing the gap . Potential 
Kennedy voters admired the Camp David agreement but had let it fade from 
memory. As a result of these findings, new advertisements emphasized the 
achievement of Camp David. The adjusted figures then shifted to a 49-38% 
margin for Carter, virtually identical to the actual vote. In the later New 
York and Pennsylvania primaries, Caddell's adjusted figures also indicated 
that large Carter leads in the public polls were melting away but changes in 
campaign strategy did not prevent Kennedy from winning both primaries. 1 
Few candidates can afford the full range of services. Because they are 
not experts in polling techniques, they must rely on the pollster to decide 
what to sacrifice in accuracy in order to keep down costs, making the deci-
sion about which pollster to hire a crucial one. According to Charles Roll 
and Albert Cantril, political candidates are poorly equipped to make this 
decision intelligently. "Candidates are almost always impressed by the 
previous clients a polling firm has worked for. Flattery and inside 
dopesterism often pique a candidate's interest. Also, cost considerations are 
frequently decisive. In the research profession, while there are rare excep-
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tions, the best salesmen do not make the best researchers and the b 
researchers are poor salesmen. " 8 Since the pollster must make a number est 
important decisions-whom to interview, whether (and how) to adjust t~f 
results, what size the sample should be, how to phrase the questi ons Wh e 
alternatives to ask about, and the order of the questions-as well as' bei: 1 
responsible for the interpretation of the data, he has considerable influen/ 
within the campaign. e 
The most significant change, however, has been in the role of th 
pollster. At first, the pollster was essentially a consultant who was hired 1~ 
take surveys, provide analysis, and leave the rest to the campaign staff. This 
first changed during John Kennedy's 1960 presidential campaig n . Louis 
Harris was not only his pollster but also an important campaig n adviser 
After the election, he stayed on as an adviser to President Kennedy: 
However, differences between Harris and other advisers, which had begun 
during the campaign, soon led to Harris' return to private life. He has since 
left candidate polling entirely and is now a leading public pollste r. 9 
In today's campaigns, the pollster has more influence than Harris 
could have dreamed of in 1960. In the most successful recent pres idential 
campaigns, the pollsters have been members of the inner circle of advisers. 
This is well illustrated by Richard Wirthlin and Patrick Cad dell. When 
Ronald Reagan fired campaign manager John Sears after the New Hamp. 
shire primary, pollster Wirthlin became his chief strategist. An indication of 
his importance is the fact that he, along with Sears' successor Willia m Casey 
and Edwin Meese, represented Reagan in the unsuccessful negot iation s to 
persuade Gerald Ford to accept the vice-presidential nomination. 10 After 
the convention, Wirthlin was put in charge of writing Reagan's campaign 
plan. He produced a 100 page report outlining twenty-one "con dition s of 
victory," later reduced to a simpler seven. During the general elect ion cam-
paign he sent a series of memoranda on the major issues to Reaga n 's other 
top advisers. 11 
Carter's pollster, Patrick Caddell, played a similar role in both 1976 
and 1980. In late June 1980, he wrote a "first cut at a genera l election 
strategy." Because he had little polling data except for the recen t primary 
states, Caddell went far beyond the pollster's role, admitting that " much of 
this memorandum is based on hunch, experience, and theory." 12 Like Wirthlin, 
he wrote a series of memos suggesting strategy for the campaign. 
When their candidates succeeded, both Caddell and Wirthlin continued 
to provide advice. During the Carter administration, Caddell ofte n advised 
the President although he was never officially a member of the White Hou se 
staff. Wirthlin has been even more active since Reagan was electe d. The 
Republican National Committee hired his firm to conduct surveys both for 
it and the White House, for a yearly fee of nearly a million dollars . Accord-
ing to Wirthlin, these polls influenced such decisions as President Reagan' s 
televised suggestion to the public to write to members of Congress urging 
support for his economic program, his deemphasis of the EI Salvado r issue, 
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d his retreat from proposals to reduce Social Security benefits. ' 3 
an The multiple roles of the new style pollster create a series of potential 
flicts of interest that may prove harmful to the political process. The re-
:~nder of this article will discuss these conflicts and suggest possible 
remedie . 
pollster Mervin Field believes that combining the roles of researcher 
nd political decision-maker results in a weakened performance in both for 
\ ,0 reasons. First, because "good research methodologists are not 
~ece sarily good policy-makers and vice-versa." Second, because "Political 
ampaigns are intense pressure cookers. A person who is both a researcher 
:nd a counselor during a political campaign usually finds the research com-
onent of this hybrid combination the first to be impaired."" 
p Pollsters generally have political experience that is limited to campaign-
ing rather than governing. Their experience is in the measurement and 
analysis of opinion, not in the substance of policy. It is therefore not sur-
pri ing to ee them advising candidates and office-holders to concentrate on 
image and public relations rather than substance. Shortly before Jimmy 
carter's inauguration, Caddell sent him a memo urging him to stress style 
over substance. "Too many good people have been beaten because they 
tried to substitute substance for style," he wrote." Late in Carter's term, 
the President delivered a "crisis of confidence" speech at Caddell's urging, 
rejecting Vice-President Mondale's view that Caddell's memo was "crazy", 
and that the country needed a statement about energy and the economy, not 
a tecture. ' 6 Similarly, in a campaign memo, Wirthlin discussed how to 
reconcile differences between Ronald Reagan's views and those of the 
public. Reagan has won the nomination "not" because his ideological posi-
tion were congruent with the electorate, but rather in spite of a rather sub-
tantial ideological gap between himself and the average Republican." 
Wirthlin sought to close this gap not by discussing policy but "by rounding 
out the total perception of Ronald Reagan as a more human, warm, ap-
proachable individual." 11 
Treating problems of substance as merely problems of image can result 
in poor public policy. A candidate may convince the public that his program 
i worth a try but once in office he will be judged by results. No matter how 
effectively a program is sold, if public support is to be maintained, it must 
be worth selling . 
The multiple roles of the pollster- "objective" data collector and 
analyst, campaign adviser, post-election adviser, and poll talker for other 
clients-produce a real conflict of interest. In the past, when a pollster was 
imply hired to take and analyze surveys, he could do so with little conflict 
of interest because he was not really part of the campaign organization. He 
did have some stake in the outcome since the success of the candidate he 
worked for could enhance his reputation, thereby improving his business. 
ow that the pollster is an important staff member, the temptations for him 
to be less objective are far greater. 
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The traditional view is that the election will force him to be objective 
As pollster Peter Hart puts it, "In political polling, impartiality means tha· 
you have not tried to load up favorable thing for your candida te. If wt 
deliver good news to our clients and it is not accurate, we are out 0; 
business." 11 This theory is far too naive to fit the reality of pol itical carn-
paigns. A lack of objectivity or profes ionalism may actually help a can-
didate get elected. 
This paradox i explained by the fact that polls are not take n simply to 
inform the candidate. Polls are frequently leaked for tactical reasons-to 
help raise funds, to mislead or di courage opponents and thei r supporters 
or to influence press coverage. ' 9 An extreme example occurred during on; 
Senate campaign when a polling firm, anxious to get a candidate's bu ine 
offered to produce two surveys-a legitimate one for use by the candidat; 
and a more favorable one to be leaked to the press and po ible con-
tributors. 20 What obligation does the poll taker have if his clien t leaks par-
tial poll results that are false or misleading? In 1979, the Natio nal Council 
on Public Polls, a voluntary association of leading polling org ani zation 
adopted a code requiring private pollsters to release the sponso rship, inter'. 
view dates, method of interviewing, population sampled, size of the sample 
and sub-samples, complete question wording, and exact percentag es used in 
analysis whenever the pollster or client release partial results. This leaves 
release to the discretion of the polling firm, especially if the leak is at-
tributed in a news report as coming from an anonymous source. How many 
pollsters will be willing to antagonize current and future clients by sabotag-
ing their strategic leaks? What if the pollster is part of the cam paign staff 
that decided to leak or, worse yet, if himself the leaker? Since the Council i 
a voluntary organization, it can do little to enforce its regulations, especially 
against non-members. In fact, Caddell's firm, Cambridge Survey Re earch, 
resigned from the Council, claiming that the new rules would violate con-
tracts with corporate clients. According to John Gorman, the firm' 
treasurer, "We're not happy to get into the role of policing ou r clients." 2 ' 
Polls may also be taken in order to influence the public. Member of 
Congress mail hundreds of thousands of questionnaires to their con-
stitutents. Although most professionals scoff at them, such " polls" make 
voters feel that their views are listened to by their representa tives who can 
also use the results to justify votes that agree with the results. Even the 
leading pollsters are not above such tactics, as illustrated by the following 
question taken from the 1982 Ohio gubernatorial primary. Po lls taken for 
Will iam Brown asked: 
As you may know, in 1974 (Jerry Springer), who had gotten mar-
ried six months earlier, was arrested on a morals charge with three 
women in a hotel room. He also used a bad check to pay for the 
women's services, and subsequently resigned as Mayor of his city. Doe 
this make you much more likely, somewhat more likely, some what le s 
likely, or much less likely to support (him) for governor th is year? 
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ch a loaded question would not even be considered by a pollster in-
~ested in accurately measuring public opinion but could be used to affect 
t~e vote of those questioned. Furthermore, the question contained 
1 
urnerous inaccuracies-Springer was not arrested, only one woman was in-
~olved, the incident occurred before he was elected Mayor and was public 
knowledge before his election to that office, the check did not bounce, the 
·ncident took place in a health club not a hotel, and he was married 18 months 
~ot six. This poll was not done by some fly-by-night pollster but by the firm 
of Patrick Caddell who, in a later interview, accepted the blame. 22 
A pollster who is an adviser may also find himself tempted to tailor his 
poll taking to support his advice. Every campaign has disagreements among 
advisers over strategy. Since even slight alterations in wording can affect 
urvey results, a pollster may, consciously or not, draw up questions or 
amples to back up his own positions. The apparent objectivity of numbers 
can make it hard to argue with them, especially against the campaign's chief 
expert on the subject. 
finally, it must be remembered that most pollsters have other clients, 
including private corporations and foreign governments. In fact, special in-
terests are probably the largest single customers for polling firms. 23 
Caddell's clients have included, in addition to numerous candidates, Con 
Edison, Exxon, Westinghouse, and Sears. 2• For members of the White 
House staff, similar involvement could violate conflict of interest laws, but 
pollster-advisers are not government employees so these laws do not apply 
to them. 
Many interest groups now hire pollsters themselves and turn the results 
over to candidates, a procedure which enables them to increase the value of 
their contributions allowed by law. For example, AMP AC, representing the 
merican Medical Association, spent $381,000 for polls in 36 congressional 
districts which they then donated to candidates. 21 Unlike a candidate, an in-
terest group does not benefit simply from winning an election. Unless a can-
didate supports their positions, his victory will not help them. Interest 
groups therefore have a real incentive, no matter how objective their other 
questions may be, to stack questions on the issues of concern to them to 
reach a predetermined result or to interpret results in favor of their position. 
Robert Cameron Mitchell cites a December 1979 Washington Post adver-
tisement placed by the American Nuclear Energy Council as one which 
deliberately exaggerated the support for nuclear power shown in a poll they 
commissioned. 26 Since polls donated to candidates are rarely made public, 
the extent of biased polls or misinterpretations can only be surmised. 
ls there anything that can be done to prevent or lessen these abuses? 
Possible reforms include the following: 
l. Voluntary measures. We have already discussed the efforts of the 
ational Council on Public Polls to encourage full and accurate disclosure 
of polls. Developing a more comprehensive code by the Council and other 
associations of pollsters is one approach but its disadvantages were also 
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pointed out. This approach was taken by the American Association f 
Political Consultants in 1975 with little impact. According to Larr y Sabato 
"Most of the AAPC code is too generalized and vague to be enforceabi°' 
but some clauses potentially could be if the will to do so were the/• 
Although the code provides for an investigating mechanism (clause 16) ~-
has not once been invoked, nor is it likely to be. " 21 There is little reason' /t 
expect pollsters to have better results than consultants, especia lly since sorn~ 
consultants are also pollsters. 
2. Disclosure. A second possibility is to require more complete 
disclosure by pollsters. The simplest method would require all pollsters 
working for candidates to register with the Federal Elections Commission 
(or equivalent state agency for state elections) and include such data as a list 
of clients and fees. In this way, the press and opposing can didate s could 
make an issue of any conflicts of interest. Another approach would be to re-
quire all polls taken for candidates to be deposited in a central archive 
shortly after the election . The press and academics could the n publicize 
shortcomings (as well as good points) of particular polls and poll sters. An 
additional advantage of this approach is that it would provide the informa-
tion needed for adding to the very small number of studi es of private 
political polling. 
Either approach would require a more thorough know ledge of polls 
than most reporters currently have. However, many newspa pers are giving 
reporters more training or, as is the case with the Washingto n Post, hiring 
their own in-house pollsters to cover public opinion and po lling stories. 
3. Pollster accrediation. Pollsters could be accredite d by an impartial 
board. Even if accreditation were voluntary, accredited po llsters would 
possess an advantage in attracting clients. A code of ethics could then be 
drawn up which accredited pollsters would have to pledge to abide by. 
Complaints against pollsters would be investigated by the bo ard. Justified 
complaints could result in public censure or a loss of accredita tion. 
This approach raises a number of difficult administrativ e problems. 
Would the board be a private or a government agency? Who would serve on 
it and how would they be selected? What standards woul d be used for 
accreditation? 
Modern technology has revolutionized the political camp aign . If we do 
not give serious thought to the dangers posed, we will have only our selves to 
blame for the consequences. 
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